Third Thoughts
4 min readSep 30, 2020

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As a fan of Manne's work, I was looking forward to reading a robust critique of her new book, but unfortunately this seems to be more a hit piece than anything else. There are several things that suggest this.

Most notably, the author claims that Manne's concept of entitlement is never made clear, although you really only need to go as far as page 4 to find the definition she lays out: entitlement is "the widespread perception that a privileged man is owed something". If this is still not clear enough for the author, he can make an argument to explain why, but it's strange he never even cites this and prefers instead to offer an exceptionally brief, handily carved up few sentences to introduce what Manne calls entitlement.

Even here, though, the author seems to be confused. He writes that "we are talking about a psychological sense, of particular men’s feelings of entitlement, while on the other side we are talking about a moral sense, of what people legitimately are entitled to." In the very next paragraph, he appears to concede that Manne's focus is not on a specific psychological sense of entitlement, and this should be abundantly clear to anyone who read Manne's "Down Girl" and understood the account of misogyny she gave there, as well as to those that read "Entitled." The "widespread perception" she talks about is societal, and nothing the author quotes in this article really shows that Manne equivocates between a socially-oriented definition of entitlement and some specific psychological one.

Mr. Traldi seems to be out to demonstrate that Manne puts her concept to "a variety of incompatible purposes," which may explain the presence of this strawman. What these incompatible purposes are is not explicitly stated. The claim about a psychological sense to her concept is asserted rather than evidenced. The second example of a "societal phenomenon" is the primary (or sole) conception Manne utilizes. Even the third example of justice women are entitled to, yet deprived of, is not recognizably incompatible with the kind of societal entitlement Manne discusses, since in this case there is something men are perceived as entitled to that women are being deprived of.

It's also doubtful that Manne's concept of entitlement is a moral sense of entitlement, too. Where she considers moral questions, these are usually secondary to the real issue of how male entitlement functions and operates in society. Some of that functioning is in what she calls "moral biases" against women, for instance, and indeed, ideas about public morality do form part of our society. It would be a mistake to see this as some sort of confounding factor in her account of entitlement. Thus, Traldi's accusation of incompatible purposes along psychological, moral, and metaphorical dimensions is grossly lacking in evidence.

We can see just how much of a problem this presents for the author's piece in some statements made throughout it. At the very end, he dismisses the notion that "people actually think it was okay for Jeffrey Epstein to groom and molest dozens of underage women, or that it is just permissible for the vast majority of men to rape a woman as long as she is black, trans, or disabled". This kind of absurdly uncharitable speculation and hyperbole is not without irony in an article that spends so much time criticizing its subject for allegedly relying too much on speculation and equivocation. More to the point, though, this is indication again that the author presumes there is some psychological implication, collective or individual, behind Manne's concept of entitlement. This is suspect even from a philosophical standpoint, since it's generally accepted that perception is not inherently conscious. So why this flawed or at least highly contentious assumption that entitlement would mean most or all of us think it's okay or permissible to do certain things?

It's especially curious that Traldi's main response to the empirical literature Manne cites is to complain that she's neglected other evidence that might not fit with her thesis. Of course, there is complexity and nuance to the empirical literature, as there always is. Without offering a thorough examination of the literature and some of the competing explanations at hand, though, Traldi is simply not equipped to really challenge Manne's case. One of his very first criticisms of her evidence notes that Manne never considers that crash test dummies are "typically male." Ironically, there's no consideration given by our critic to why this might be, including how this fact supports Manne's contention that men's bodies are given default status in research.

When entitlement is specifically under discussion as a form of misogyny in a vein like that articulated by Manne, it won't do to merely toss out a handful of counter-examples without serious analysis. Some of these counter-examples may appear persuasive on the surface, yet can have misogynistic justifications underlying them - notably in a case like the "women-are-wonderful effect." Some of these examples also may not represent the advancements for women that they're often taken to show. On the other hand, if Traldi is correct that Manne's case is overstated, digging deeper could help elucidate this. It's a shame then that he and his oddly anonymous philosopher co-author leave it at such a surface level, only willing to show her explanation is not "the only" explanation. Undoubtedly, this is true, but it's not sufficient to undermine her arguments, especially not when Manne's discussion of the literature is nowhere near as "thin" as what Traldi and co. offer in response.

To wrap up this lengthy little comment, I'd recommend reading "Entitled" for yourself rather than trusting the weak criticisms of it that have been attempted in this piece. Perhaps it would benefit the author to consult with Professor Manne next time - to do her arguments justice and make sure they're not strawmanning her - as is common practice in academic philosophy. Or alternatively, perhaps steel-manning her case and granting for the sake of argument the central concept at the heart of the text would be a better way to make a truly substantive critique. Traldi's review may offer a second opinion, but its limitations and flaws are worth recognizing.

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Third Thoughts
Third Thoughts

Written by Third Thoughts

Beyond second thoughts. This page is kept by a writer, reader, musician, and graduate in philosophy and religious studies.

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